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s the continuing Eurozone recession 
and sovereign debt emergencies show, 
the turbulent impacts of the inancial crisis crises 
of recent years are far from over. Yet 1 April, if the 
coalition government is correct, was supposed 
to represent a new start in UK inancial services 
regulation. And no, that wasn’t an April Fool’s joke. 
Two new bodies, the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) and the Prudential Regulatory Authority 
(PRA) have taken up the regulatory reins in the 
most radical restructuring of inancial regulation 
since the reforms of Blair’s irst term. Gone is 
the tripartite system of old which we were told in 
1997 would harness the combined strengths of 
the Bank of England (BoE), Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), and HM Treasury (Treasury).
Perhaps unfairly the blame game following 
the early phases of the Great Recession has 
focused attention on the perceived lax regulatory 
approach of the FSA. Much of this criticism 
centred on the FSA’s principles-based approach 
to regulation, the notion that broad ethical 
principles could be implemented by individual 
irms in a bespoke way. This approach should 
facilitate customised compliance and avoid the 
morass of regulatory rules which characterise, 
say, the US approach. But textbook theories do 
not always transition perfectly to practice.
Of course, principles-based regulation is  
not a distinctly British approach. Indeed, the 
blueprint for this regulatory style lies largely 
with the EU’s Lamfalussy process of integration 
which, in a nod to Member State objections  
to harmonisation of inancial regulation, 
developed a scheme based on guiding 
principles. The EU would set principles  
but Member States, unconvinced of the 
arguments for enhanced integration, would 
retain considerable autonomy to ill in the detail. 
Unsurprisingly, as in the UK, signiicant  
reform is now also occurring at the European 
level.
The new structures
The Financial Services Act 2012 (2012 Act) has 
radically overhauled the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (2000 Act) and represents 
something of a step-change in inancial services 
regulation. It has brought with it a new regulatory 
vocabulary focusing on twin peaks regulation 
(prudential regulation and conduct regulation) 
where once tripartite regulation was in vogue. 
Aside from this promiscuous proliferation of 
terms, the new framework represents a clearer 
delineation of functions and responsibilities. The 
new twin peaks are:
• The FCA, which will take on the vast majority 
of the regulatory functions previously assigned 
to the FSA, particularly with respect to regulated 
irms’ conduct of business obligations; and
• The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), 
which is now responsible for the micro-prudential 
regulation of inancial institutions of systemic 
importance, such as banks, building societies, 
and insurers.
The relationship between the FCA and 
PRA will be important. Whilst the tripartite 
system has been severely criticised for splitting 
responsibilities between three bodies, a question 
remains as to whether this approach was 
doomed by faulty design or simply wasn’t up 
to the mark in practice. A disjointed regulatory 
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framework came into being, but perhaps more 
so due to its operation in practice rather than 
inherent structural failings, where the Chancellor, 
the Governor of the Bank of England, and the 
head of the Financial Services Authority never 
met. This framework, characterised by little 
communication between the Treasury and the 
FSA, contributed to a complacent conidence 
that failed to take stock of accumulating risks.
In fact, a picture has since emerged of 
institutional star-gazing during the critical 
window before the onset of the crisis. In 2006 
the Bank of England’s Financial Stability Report 
speciically identiied the dangerous funding gap 
in British banking. A simulation at the FSA in the 
same year concluded that the deposit guarantee 
scheme was not adequate to prevent bank runs. 
Yet there was no response to these lashing 
amber lights and the relationship between the 
key actors in tripartite regulation continued 
to remain a distant one. As a result, there’s a 
very important distinction to be drawn between 
design failure and operational failure: attributing 
too much blame to the tripartite model alone, 
rather than the performance of and relationship 
between key actors, might well miss the bigger 
picture. It is not just structures which are 
important, but processes too.
The new objectives of the FCA
The 2012 Act establishes a hierarchical structure 
of objectives, replacing in its entirety the 
statutory objectives of the 2000 Act. The Brown 
government had tinkered with these objectives 
during the depths of the crisis amending the 
2000 Act by inserting a new “inancial stability” 
objective, but at that point such changes 
appeared more as closing the stable door after 
the horse had bolted.
The 2012 Act represents a far more 
coherent overhaul of inancial regulation. 
The new statutory architecture is guided by 
a core strategic objective of “ensuring that 
the relevant markets function well”. Originally 
the Bill contained a strategic objective of 
protecting and enhancing conidence in the UK 
inancial system. However, after criticism that 
such language could encourage misplaced 
conidence, the objective was redeined to 
impose a positive obligation on the FCA to 
ensure that the markets function “well”. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly Parliament has shied away from 
any clear expression of what represents a 
well-functioning market. However, this is possibly 
best understood by contrasting the much clearer 
image of a poor-functioning market. Clearly this 
is far from a scientiic metric, but it would not be 
helpful to constrain the interpretative autonomy 
of the FCA. It is welcome that, for the irst time, 
inancial regulation is now guided by a clear 
undiluted objective.
Regrettably, the secondary operational 
objectives and the interrelationship between 
these objectives lack the same clarity. The 
three operational objectives are to secure an 
appropriate degree of protection for consumers; 
to promote eficiency and choice in the inancial 
services market; and to protect and enhance 
the integrity of the UK inancial system. There 
is a singular lack of guidance as to how each 
operational objective should be balanced with 
respect to the others. As the 2012 Act provides 
that the FCA must discharge its general 
functions in a manner which is compatible with 
the strategic objective and which advances 
one or more operational objective, it may well 
transpire that, in practice, one of the operational 
objectives will predominate. For example, the 
2012 Act also grants new powers to the FCA to 
ban certain inancial products, powers which 
are particularly consistent with promoting the 
consumer protection objective. Indeed, in recent 
years, the increasing emphasis in EU and 
UK inancial services regulation on consumer 
protection is perhaps one of the most marked 
trends and an argument could certainly be 
advanced that the promotion of competition and 
the integrity of the UK inancial system further 
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enhances consumer protection. 
The new statutory objectives also represent 
a departure from the prominent emphasis which 
the 2000 Act placed on the reduction of inancial 
crime. This concern is no longer afforded 
“objective” status, but the 2012 Act continues to 
impose an obligation on the FCA to “minimise 
the extent to which it is possible for a business 
to be used for a purpose connected with 
inancial crime”. The third operational objective 
of integrity explicitly also entails a concern that 
the UK inancial system is not used for purposes 
connected with inancial crime. However, it is 
hard to deny that the 2012 Act has introduced a 
clear difference in emphasis.
Whilst the FCA must remain cognisant 
of inancial criminality, particularly since any 
signiicant increase in inancial crime would 
undermine the integrity objective, it is a 
smaller piece of the statutory mosaic than has 
previously been the case. In any event, given the 
proliferation of inancial crime statutes in recent 
years, the Fraud Act 2006 and Bribery Act 2010 
being obvious examples, it is positive that the 
opportunity for restructuring inancial regulation 
has not been unduly inluenced by inancial 
crime concerns to the detriment of the full range 
of challenges confronting inancial regulation. 
The successes of the FSA in the past year in 
prosecuting instances of insider dealing, notably 
R v Mustafa and R v Ammann, are especially 
welcome. In the past, it has proven notoriously 
challenging for the FSA to secure convictions 
in the realm of insider dealing and these high-
proile cases show that market participants who 
facilitate inancial crime run very real risks of 
detection and conviction. In practice, it is unlikely 
that the FCA will be less rigorous in protecting 
investors from inancial crime, irrespective of this 
statutory re-ordering of priorities.
Looking ahead
There are certainly valid concerns that the 
complexity of the new statutory objectives, and 
particularly the challenge of reconciling these 
objectives, could cause some headaches for 
the FCA. Ascertaining when the markets are 
not functioning well may not be straightforward, 
but the new strategic objective should provide a 
much clearer focus to regulatory energies. The 
role of the FSA was always ambiguous, with 
Parliament expecting the FSA to be a policeman 
in the inancial markets, the promoter of these 
same markets, and the guardian of the UK’s 
competitiveness. This was exacerbated by the 
lack of communication and collaboration which 
characterised the tripartite system.
The new regulatory authorities, the PRA and 
the FCA, have different statutory objectives, 
but a close regulatory dialogue between both 
actors will be critical to the success of the twin 
peaks formula. The 2012 Act goes some way to 
compelling such collaboration. The legislation 
expressly requires both the PRA and FCA to 
cooperate with the Bank of England. In addition, 
the Financial Policy Committee, located within 
the Bank of England and tasked with macro-
prudential regulation of the UK inancial system, 
may also provide directions to the PRA or FCA. 
In such circumstances, both the PRA and FCA 
are under a statutory duty to comply or explain 
any shortfall in compliance.
Whilst the new framework is certainly not 
light-reading, it has introduced a structure 
where close cooperation between regulatory 
actors should become the norm. This normative 
change will be as important as the structural 
overhaul which the 2012 Act represents. The 
promise of the new framework is a much 
more stable foundation for inancial services 
regulation. However, it will be some time before 
we can judge whether the PRA and FCA have 
fulilled this promise.
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